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The	Italian	election:	Continuity,	change,	and
Berlusconi’s	rebirth
Opinion	polls	predict	that	on	4	March	Italians	will	award	most	seats	to	a	centre-right	coalition	led	by
Silvio	Berlusconi,	who	seems	set	to	return	as	the	pivotal	figure	in	the	country’s	politics,	despite	a	recent
conviction	for	tax	fraud	that	means	he	is	currently	banned	from	holding	public	office.	Andrea
Capussela	seeks	to	explain	Berlusconi’s	revival,	linking	his	fortunes	to	the	country’s	deeper	politico-
economic	problems.
Credit:	European	People’s	Party	(CC	BY	2.0)
In	November	2011,	as	the	winds	of	the	Eurozone	crisis	were	rising	rapidly,	menacingly	threatening	Italy’s	sovereign
debt,	its	prime	minister	resigned.	What	triggered	this	decision	was	the	widespread	perception,	in	the	country	and
abroad,	that	the	then	cabinet	was	unfit	to	meet	that	challenge.	That	prime	minister	was	Silvio	Berlusconi.
His	party	came	third	at	the	election	held	in	early	2013,	but	nonetheless	managed	to	win	22	per	cent	of	the	vote.	A	few
months	later,	however,	Italy’s	supreme	court	upheld	his	conviction	for	tax	fraud,	depriving	him	of	his	parliamentary
seat,	and	disqualifying	him	from	public	office	for	several	years.	But	thanks	to	an	old	general	amnesty,	and	to	special
rules	for	old	people,	his	four-year	sentence	was	converted	into	one	year	of	community	service:	so	for	twelve	months
Berlusconi	made	weekly	visits	to	an	old-age	hospital,	to	keep	up	the	spirits	of	the	guests	(the	man	is	said	to	be
jovial).
Shortly	after	that	judgement,	Matteo	Renzi	took	over	the	Democratic	Party	(PD),	the	pillar	of	Italy’s	centre-left.	He
soon	became	prime	minister,	raising	great	expectations,	and	led	his	party	to	an	unprecedented	result	(41	per	cent)	at
the	European	elections	of	May	2014.
Three	months	later	the	supreme	court	upheld	a	seven-year	sentence	issued	to	a	certain	Marcello	Dell’Utri,	for	having
abetted	the	Sicilian	mafia.	He	fled	to	Lebanon	but	was	arrested,	extradited,	and	jailed.	This	man	was	for	long	the
chief	executive	of	the	advertising	company	that	is	the	cash-generating	core	of	Berlusconi’s	media	business;	widely
viewed	as	his	‘right-hand	man’,	he	is	generally	credited	with	a	decisive	contribution	in	conceiving	and	setting	up
Berlusconi’s	political	party,	Forza	Italia,	in	1993-4.	His	contribution	to	the	mafia,	the	judges	ascertained,	was	to
mediate	between	the	latter	and	Berlusconi,	who	was	said	to	have	regularly	paid	the	mafia	for	protection	between
1974	and	1992	(Berlusconi	was	investigated	but	not	charged	for	this;	yet	to	gauge	the	nature	of	his	interaction	with
the	mafia	it	may	be	useful	to	recall	that	in	1984–5	he	was	powerful	enough	to	obtain	from	the	government	two
legislative	measures	aimed	directly	at	safeguarding	his	private	television	channels,	the	so-called	‘Berlusconi
decrees’).
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Given	this	history,	some	may	be	surprised	to	read	that	polls	unanimously	predict	that	a	centre-right	coalition
assembled	around	Berlusconi’s	party	will	win	most	seats	in	the	general	election	scheduled	for	4	March,	and	that,
though	banned	from	public	office,	he	is	widely	expected	to	return	as	the	pivotal	figure	in	Italian	politics.	No	less
remarkably,	the	centre-right	tops	the	polls	despite	Berlusconi’s	repetition	of	his	familiar	electoral	promises,	which	are
as	fiscally	irresponsible	as	lacking	in	credibility,	and	his	equally	typical	promises	of	tolerance	for	illegality	–	for	illegal
construction,	for	instance,	which	since	the	1950s	is	steadily	defacing	the	peninsula’s	landscapes.
The	established	explanation
So,	what	explains	Berlusconi’s	scarcely	comprehensible	success?	A	fairly	established	explanation	exists.	It	is
plausible	but	incomplete.	Readers	of	EUROPP	found	parts	of	it	in	a	recent	post,	by	the	political	scientist	Fabio
Bordignon,	who	quotes	the	‘failures’	of	the	centre-left,	which	dominated	the	last	parliament,	the	new	hybrid	electoral
law,	which	eased	the	centre-right’s	re-unification,	the	tri-polar	political	system	created	by	the	rise	of	the	Five	Star
Movement,	and	Berlusconi’s	positional	advantage,	in	this	context,	in	future	coalition	negotiations.
The	historian	Giovanni	Orsina,	who	wrote	a	careful	and	insightful	study	of	the	admixture	of	populism	and	liberalism
that	goes	by	the	name	of	‘Berlusconism’,	points	also	to	the	man’s	‘vitality’,	wealth,	and	mass	media,	the	‘mediocrity’
of	his	competitors,	especially	in	the	centre-left,	and	Renzi’s	‘failure’.	I	should	like	to	add	a	somewhat	deeper	reason,
linked	to	Italy’s	politico-economic	equilibrium	(which	I	seek	to	describe	in	a	forthcoming	book).	But	I	shall	reach	that
argument	moving	from	the	main	element	of	the	established	explanation,	namely	Renzi’s,	the	PD’s,	and	the	centre-
left’s	‘failures’.
The	record	of	the	centre-left
The	centre-left	promised	many	reforms	but	accomplished	rather	few,	including	some	controversial	ones,	and	was
roundly	defeated	on	the	most	symbolic	one,	on	which	it	invested	much	political	capital.	This	was	the	ill-conceived
constitutional	reform	which	Italians	rejected	on	4	December	2016,	leading	Renzi	to	resign	and	many	to	bemoan	his
avoidable	misstep.	But	his	tactical	mistakes	are	not	the	only	or	even	the	main	reason	for	his	political	misfortunes.
Despite	the	depth	and	length	of	Italy’s	recession,	the	worst	in	its	peace-time	history,	and	an	exceptionally	favourable
external	macroeconomic	environment,	the	country	returned	to	stable	growth	one	or	two	years	later	than	its	peers,	its
growth	rate	remains	the	lowest	in	the	Eurozone,	and	its	unemployment	rate	among	the	highest	(1.3	and	11.4	per
cent,	respectively,	according	to	the	latest	IMF	yearly	report	on	Italy’s	economy,	published	in	July	2017).	Poverty	and
vulnerability	have	risen	menacingly,	and	average	real	disposable	income	is	still	at	about	the	same	level	it	was	in
1995:	by	comparison,	in	France,	Germany,	and	Spain	it	is	about	25	per	cent	higher.	Underlying	all	this	is	the	dismal
performance	of	productivity	and	especially	of	total	factor	productivity	(an	indicator	which	measures,	roughly,	an
economy’s	technological	and	organisational	progress),	which	effectively	ceased	growing	more	than	two	decades
ago.
Faced	with	these	challenges,	the	PD’s	signature	measures	were	an	attempt	to	stem	the	segmentation	of	the	labour
market,	rationalise	its	elements	of	flexibility	and,	more	controversially,	marginally	increase	them,	which	did	little	to
reduce	unemployment,	and	an	80-euro	monthly	transfer	to	the	lower	middle	classes,	which	was	partly	saved	and
partly	spent.	Public	investment	barely	recovered	from	the	exceptionally	low	levels	reached	during	the	height	of	the
crisis,	conversely,	and	the	university	sector	continued	losing	funds,	students,	teachers,	and	courses.	Such	policies
reflect	less	a	single-minded	effort	to	raise	productivity	than	a	mixture	of	survival	strategies	and	political	calculations,
neither	of	which	were	too	successful.
On	most	rule-of-law	and	political-accountability	issues,	finally,	such	as	corruption,	tax	evasion,	illegal	construction,
political	clientelism,	and	public	ethics,	Renzi’s	PD	failed	to	differentiate	itself	from	Berlusconi’s	centre-right	sharply
enough	to	appear	as	a	genuine	alternative	to	it.	Renzi	all	but	admitted	that	during	a	recent	interview	devoted	also	to
these	matters,	when	he	invited	Italians	to	‘hold	their	noses	and	vote	PD’.	This	is	a	verbatim	quotation	of	a	famous
quip	of	the	1970s,	when	many	chose	the	Christian	Democrats,	despite	their	clientelism	and	corruption,	to	avert	a
Communist	victory:	not	without	some	reason,	Renzi	was	implicitly	equating	that	‘danger’	to	a	possible	victory	of	either
Berlusconi	and	his	xenophobic,	nationalist,	and	neo-fascist	partners,	or	the	Five	Star	Movement,	widely	viewed	as
incompetent.
The	missing	explanation	and	the	paradox	it	entails
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Few	impartial	observers	would	nonetheless	dispute	that	the	centre-left’s	performance	in	2013-17,	and	Renzi’s	own
2014-16	stint,	was	superior	to	that	of	the	centre-right’s	2001-6	and	2008-11	cabinets,	in	almost	every	respect.	So,
while	one	can	easily	understand	why,	in	the	socio-economic	context	I	sketched	above,	the	Five	Star	Movement	is
gaining	ground,	with	its	slogans	of	integrity	and	transparency,	the	conventional	analysis	seems	unable	to	explain	the
reversal	of	fortunes	between	centre-left	and	centre-right.	I	therefore	turn	to	the	deeper	reason	of	Berlusconi’s	political
rebirth	that	I	mentioned	earlier,	which	is	the	valuable	guarantee	of	stability	and	predictability	that	he	offers	to	a	vast
segment	of	Italian	society.
The	premise	of	this	argument,	which	I	shall	take	for	granted,	is	that	Berlusconi	is	a	genuine	product	of	the	country’s
inefficient	politico-economic	equilibrium,	characterised	by	comparatively	low	political	accountability	and	economic
competition,	entrenched	collusion	between	the	rent-seeking	segments	of	the	political	and	economic	elites,	a	long-
sedimented	system	for	the	particularistic	inclusion	of	the	middle	classes,	clientelism,	corruption,	tax	evasion,	and
organised	crime.
With	the	possible	exception	of	the	latter,	none	of	these	phenomena	is	unique	to	Italy,	in	either	the	Eurozone	or	the
G7	economies:	what	is	unique,	and	explains	much	of	Italy’s	productivity	gap	with	its	peers,	is	their	gravity	and
combination.	Yet	those	phenomena	are	precisely	what	Berlusconi	refers	to	in	the	message	that,	as	Orsina’s	book
persuasively	argues,	underlies	his	whole	political	stance:	the	message	–	I	paraphrase	him	–	is	that	‘Italians	are	fine
as	they	are,	with	all	their	vices,	and	need	not	change’.	This	message,	as	Orsina	and	others	have	argued,	largely
explains	Berlusconi’s	political	victories	(and,	I	would	add,	also	his	recent	rebirth).
But	herein	lies	a	paradox,	for	by	condoning	Italians’	‘vices’	that	message	alludes	to	the	causes	of	serious	economic
and	political	inefficiencies,	which	can	be	assumed	to	be	detrimental	also	to	the	interests	of	the	vast	majority	of	the
dozen	million	Italians	–	assuming	a	70	per	cent	turnout	(5	points	less	than	in	2013)	and	a	34	per	cent	share	of	the
vote	–	who	are	projected	to	vote	for	his	coalition.	Whether	or	not	they	engage	in	petty	corruption,	tax	evasion,	or
clientelism,	in	fact,	most	of	those	millions	of	citizens	would	live	better,	often	much	better,	in	a	country	in	which	public
services	were	of	higher	quality,	corruption	lower,	and	the	tax	burden	more	fairly	and	efficiently	spread	among	both
households	and	firms.	So,	why	will	they	vote	for	a	politician	who	promises	to	keep	things	as	they	are?	To	answer	this
question	we	must	return	to	a	critical	juncture	in	Italy’s	post-war	history.
Rupture	and	continuity	in	Italy’s	political-economic	equilibrium
In	the	spring	of	1992,	a	vast	corruption	investigation	began	in	Milan,	spread	to	other	cities,	and	eventually	implicated
a	large	share	of	Italy’s	political	and	economic	elites	(3,000	politicians	and	businessmen	were	indicted).	As	the	wave
of	arrests	progressed,	popular	indignation	rose,	stoked	also	by	a	grave	debt	and	currency	crisis	which	imposed	an
exceptionally	stiff	budget	adjustment.	One	by	one,	the	five	parties	that	had	ruled	the	country	since	1948	dissolved,
between	1993	and	1994.	This	unprecedented	rupture	was	christened	as	the	birth	of	a	‘Second	Republic’,	which	was
expected	to	bring	more	transparent,	accountable,	and	responsive	government.
As	figures	1–3	suggest,	conversely,	corruption	has	likely	grown	over	the	past	two	decades,	the	rule	of	law	has
weakened,	and	political	accountability	has	remained	comparatively	low	(I	compare	Italy	to	the	United	States,	its
European	peers,	and	two	smaller	economies	and	more	recent	democracies,	Poland	and	Spain).	The	figures	are
drawn	from	the	World	Bank	Institute’s	Worldwide	Governance	Indicators,	which	integrate	all	available	indicators
(including,	for	instance,	those	of	Transparency	International).	They	are	to	be	taken	with	caution,	of	course,	but	the
trends	are	clear	and	the	gap	that	separates	Italy	from	the	comparators	significant.	It	is	worth	noting	also	that	the	year
at	the	start	of	these	time	series,	1996,	was	just	after	the	peak	of	the	anti-corruption	investigations,	when	their
dissuasive	effect	can	be	assumed	to	have	still	been	strong.
Figure	1:	Control	of	Corruption
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Note:	This	indicator	ranges	between	2.5	and	-2.5,	and	reflects	‘perceptions	of	the	extent	to	which	public	power	is	exercised	for
private	gain,	including	both	petty	and	grand	forms	of	corruption,	as	well	as	“capture”	of	the	state	by	elites	and	private	interests’.
Source:	WGI
Figure	2:	Rule	of	Law
Note:	This	indicator	ranges	between	2.5	and	-2.5,	and	reflects	‘perceptions	of	the	extent	to	which	agents	have	confidence	in	and
abide	by	the	rules	of	society,	and	in	particular	the	quality	of	contract’.	Source:	WGI
Figure	3:	Voice	and	Accountability
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Note:	This	indicator	ranges	between	2.5	and	-2.5,	and	reflects	‘perceptions	of	the	extent	to	which	a	country’s	citizens	are	able	to
participate	in	selecting	their	government,	as	well	as	freedom	of	expression,	freedom	of	association,	and	a	free	media’.	Source:
WGI
In	my	analysis,	the	main	reason	why	the	expectations	raised	by	the	rupture	of	1992-4	were	dashed	is	that	the
electorate	was	not	presented	with	proposals	credible	enough	to	engender	the	expectation	that	the	country	would
have	shifted	to	a	low-corruption	equilibrium	(for	simplicity,	here	I	shall	focus	only	on	this	element	of	Italy’s	politico-
economic	equilibrium).	Credible	enough,	in	other	words,	to	lead	citizens	to	behave	as	if	public-spiritedness	was
individually	rational,	and	thereby	make	it	individually	rational	to	eschew	opportunism.
The	logic	of	continuity	and	Berlusconi’s	success
A	high-corruption,	low-accountability	equilibrium	is	generally	beneficial	for	the	less	innovative	and	competitive
segments	of	the	political	and	economic	elites,	which	draw	rents	from	it	and	are	protected	from	Schumpeterian
creative	destruction.	It	is	typically	damaging	for	ordinary	citizens	and	firms,	conversely.	They	resort	to	corruption	and
clientelism	chiefly	to	obtain,	as	private	goods,	those	public	goods	that	the	inefficiency	of	the	governance	system
denies	to	them:	in	such	an	equilibrium	it	may	be	individually	rational	for	them	to	engage	in	such	practices,	because
unless	a	critical	mass	of	citizens	and	firms	is	capable	of	coordinating	its	actions	–	voting,	demonstrating,	rejecting
and	reporting	corruption	–	in	such	a	way	as	to	change	the	extant	equilibrium,	the	cost-benefit	calculus	generally
favours	opportunistic	over	public-spirited	behaviour.
Such	an	equilibrium	can	be	modelled	as	an	assurance	game,	in	fact,	in	which	reciprocated	public-spirited	behaviour
and	reciprocated	opportunistic	behaviour	are	both	stable	equilibria,	and	the	former	yields	the	highest	payoff.	In	this
setting,	opportunism	is	a	defensive	strategy,	therefore,	which	becomes	rational	when	opportunism	is	expected	from
one’s	peers.	When	this	logic	prevails,	an	equilibrium	of	reciprocated	opportunism	sets	in,	which	is	likely	to	persist
until	ordinary	citizens	and	firms	succeed	in	overcoming	their	collective	action	problem,	namely	in	coordinating	their
strategies	towards	public-spirited	behaviour	(which	yields	a	higher	payoff:	I	shall	leave	other	important	motivations	–
values	and	normative	beliefs	–	for	disliking	corruption	aside).
Absent	the	credible	prospect	of	an	equilibrium	shift,	therefore,	which	alone	could	have	changed	their	expectations,	in
1994	many	voters	anticipated	the	effects	of	the	resumption	of	the	pre-1992	equilibrium	and	voted	according	to	the
incentives	flowing	from	it	(namely,	the	payoff	structure	and	cost-benefit	calculus	mentioned	earlier).	Voters	who	a	few
months	earlier	had	clamoured	for	change	chose	the	coalition	headed	by	Berlusconi,	a	businessman	who	had
prospered	under	the	old	equilibrium,	precisely	because	he	promised	to	preserve	and	stabilise	it,	while	making	it	more
efficient	and	‘liberal’.	The	same	was	true	in	subsequent	elections,	and	his	opponents	too	effectively	bowed	to	this
logic.	They	were	in	office	in	1996-2001,	2006-8,	and	2014-16,	with	no	discernible	or	lasting	effect	on	the	level	of
corruption	or	the	quality	of	the	rule	of	law:	indeed,	Renzi’s	PD	was	not	alone	in	the	centre-left	in	failing	to	credibly
present	itself	as	a	sharply	alternative	political	option	to	the	centre-right	on	rule-of-law	and	political-accountability
matters.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: The Italian election: Continuity, change, and Berlusconi’s rebirth Page 5 of 6
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-02-27
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/02/27/the-italian-election-continuity-change-and-berlusconis-rebirth/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Stability	is	the	critical	perspective	to	explain	these	choices,	diametrically	opposed	to	that	of	an	equilibrium	shift.	The
reason	lies	in	the	wide	chasm	that	separated,	and	still	separates,	Italy’s	formal	institutions	(i.e.,	its	written	laws)	from
its	actual	ones	(i.e.,	the	rules	that	actually	govern	political,	economic,	and	social	exchange,	as	Douglass	North
defines	them).	For	by	enforcing	the	law	upon	opportunistic	practices	that	had	hitherto	relied	on	permissive	norms,	in
1992-4	the	judicial	investigations	had	disrupted	the	balance	that	allowed	the	two	sets	of	rules	to	coexist	in	a	fairly
harmonious	and	predictable	system.	This	created	uncertainty	and	instability,	as	it	was	no	longer	clear	which	set	of
institutions	prevailed:	whether	the	formal	ones,	which	proscribed	corruption,	or	the	actual	ones,	which	often
condoned	it.
This	kind	of	instability	may	seem	desirable	if	it	is	viewed	in	a	dynamic	perspective,	that	of	an	equilibrium	shift,
because	it	opens	up	opportunities	for	change:	but	instability	is	merely	disruptive	if	it	is	viewed	in	the	perspective	of
continuity.	This	is	why,	once	the	prospect	of	an	equilibrium	shift	dissolved,	much	of	society	opted	for	a	return	to
stability	and	predictability,	despite	the	costs	in	terms	of	economic	efficiency	and	political	legitimacy.
The	paradox	explained
So,	Berlusconi’s	message	was	successful	because	it	was	consistent	not	just	with	the	interests	of	the	rent-seeking
segment	of	Italy’s	elites,	but	also	the	cost-benefit	calculus	of	many	ordinary	citizens	and	firms.	It	reassured	the
former	about	their	rents,	and	signalled	to	the	latter	that	public-spirited	behaviour	was	unlikely	to	be	reciprocated.
We	may	thus	return	to	the	conventional	list	of	Berlusconi’s	strengths.	Orsina	concludes	his	analysis	arguing	that,
viewed	next	to	his	competitors,	‘Berlusconi,	albeit	undesirable,	may	seem	to	many	the	least	undesirable’.	Taken
literally,	this	assessment	is	easily	refutable,	especially	when	the	centre-right	is	compared	to	the	centre-left:	they	have
a	better	record	in	office,	and	at	least	proclaim	an	aspiration	to	strengthen	the	rule	of	law	and	political	accountability,
the	improvement	of	which	is	in	the	individual	interest	of	the	vast	majority	of	Berlusconi’s	own	electorate.
The	reasoning	of	his	prospective	voters	becomes	clear	only	when	we	consider	that	his	reliable	promise	of	continuity
is	for	many	rationally	preferable	–	from	the	standpoint,	at	least,	of	their	material	interests	–	to	the	PD’s	half-hearted
promise	of	discontinuity,	which	can	be	expected	to	lead	to	more	erratic	policy-making,	fighting	corruption	and
clientelism	with	one	hand	and	tolerating	them	with	the	other,	and	less	predictable	outcomes.	To	shed	this	logic,	those
twelve	million	citizens,	and	many	other	ones,	will	need	distinctly	more	credible	prospects	for	an	equilibrium	shift.
Hopefully,	this	election	will	force	the	country	to	open	the	battle	of	ideas,	from	which	such	prospects	could	eventually
emerge.
This	article	draws	on	Andrea	Lorenzo	Capussela’s	forthcoming	book	on	Italy
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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